Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law
Journal
Volume 13 Volume XIII
Number 2 Volume XIII Book 2

Article 1

2003

Panel I: Legal Issues in Sports Security
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
Harvard Law School

Milton Ahlerich
National Football League

Norman Siegel
Freedom Legal Defense and Education Project

William D. Squires
Giants Stadium

Paul H. Zoubek
Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.; Milton Ahlerich; Norman Siegel; William D. Squires; Paul H. Zoubek; and Laura
Freedman, Panel I: Legal Issues in Sports Security, 13 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 349 (2003).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol13/iss2/1

This Transcript is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Panel I: Legal Issues in Sports Security
Authors
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.; Milton Ahlerich; Norman Siegel; William D. Squires; Paul H. Zoubek; and Laura
Freedman

This transcript is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal:
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol13/iss2/1

1 - PANEL I FORMAT

4/15/03 9:25 AM

PANEL I: Legal Issues in Sports
Security
Moderator:
Panelists:

Richard H. Fallon, Jr.*
Milton Ahlerich†
Norman Siegel‡
William D. Squires§
Paul H. Zoubek||

MS. FREEDMAN:# Our first panel this morning is entitled
“Legal Issues in Sports Security.”
In the wake of the tragic events of September 11th,1 security
has been foremost in our minds. While the measures that have
been taken in response have enabled us to continue on with our
*

Professor, Harvard Law School. A.B., Yale University, 1975; B.A., Oxford
University, Rhodes Scholar, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1980.
†
Vice President of Security, National Football League. Assistant Director in Charge
of Public Affairs; Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Lab, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1970–95. B.A., Kansas State University, 1968.
‡
Executive Director, Freedom Legal Defense and Education Project. Executive
Director, New York Civil Liberties Union, 1985–2001. B.A., Brooklyn College, 1965;
J.D., New York University School of Law, 1968.
§
Vice President and General Manager, Giants Stadium. Commander, United States
Naval Reserves. Director of Stadium Operations, Cleveland Browns Stadium, 1999–
2000. General Manager, Disney’s Wide World of Sports, 1996–99. Director of Stadium
Operations, New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, 1990–96. Director of Stadium
Operations, Yankee Stadium, 1987–90. B.A., United States Naval Academy, 1975.
||
Of Counsel, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads. Counsel, New Jersey
Domestic Preparedness Task Force. First Assistant Attorney General, New Jersey
Department of Law and Public Safety, 1999–2001. Director, New Jersey Division of
Criminal Justice, 1997–2000. Deputy Chief, New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice,
1987–97. Assistant U.S. Attorney, New Jersey, 1987–97. B.A., cum laude, Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, 1978; J.D.,
New York University School of Law, 1982.
#
Laura Freedman, Co-Symposium Editor, Fordham Sports Law Forum, Fordham
University School of Law. B.A., University of Delaware, 2000; J.D. expected, Fordham
University School of Law, 2003.
1
See Robert D. McFadden, After the Attacks: The Overview; Stunned Rescuers Comb
Attack Sites, But Thousands Are Presumed Dead; F.B.I. Tracking Hijackers’ Movements,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at A1.
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everyday lives and provide us with a sense of safety, we must ask
the cost of these measures. At what point do the heightened
security measures impede upon our rights so much that they
diminish the very democratic rights we are protecting?
This panel will examine such issues from the perspective of
sports security. Our panelists today will brief us on the types of
security measures being taken by sports leagues and venues and
examine how have they responded to this new America. We will
examine these measures and look at how in efforts to protect us,
our legal rights may be even more at risk than ever.
Without further ado, “Legal Issues in Sports Security.”
PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much, Laura.
I am delighted to be here today. I think we have a fascinating
panel.
I will now ask the panelists to speak in the following order:
Milton Ahlerich, William Squires, Paul Zoubek, and finally
Norman Siegel.
As I turn to Milton Ahlerich, I would ask him to deal with
whatever issues he thinks would be of most interest to the
audience, but I hope that in the course of his remarks he will talk
about what he is currently worried about with respect to sports
security, how his worries may have changed since September 11th,
and what he is doing about his worries in the way of trying to
ensure safety at sporting events.
MR. AHLERICH: Thank you, Professor. It is a real pleasure
to be with you and have the opportunity to discuss these issues.
We have been very focused over the last six months on doing
the very best job we could to provide safety and security for our
fans, and this presents a terrific opportunity for me to step back,
reflect, and discuss with you some of the issues that are evolving.
In my post as the Vice President of Security for the National
Football League (NFL), we have a variety of security programs
that deal with protecting our most important assets,2 and our most
2

See Thomas George, N.F.L. Is Tightening Security As Games Resume on Sunday,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at C18; Bob Glauber, NFL Will Beef Up Security, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), Sept. 18, 2001, at A42.
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important assets are not only the game and the fans—certainly the
events themselves are very, very high on the list—but also our
most important human resources, our players.3 They are extremely
important to us, and looking after them and being sure that we are
doing everything that we can to protect them and to avoid issues
with them is also part of my job.
In addition, we are looking at our most important business
relationships and trying to be sure that those are good business
relationships and that we are not doing business with people with
whom we should not be doing business.
The integrity of the game is probably the highest thing on our
list, next to event security, in terms of an important asset that the
NFL wants to be sure stays in place.4 If you believe the game is
fixed or you believe that people who are playing the game are
betting, you will have a very poor opinion and you probably are
not going to watch our games5 So the integrity of the game is an
important asset. It is hard to manage.
After September 11th the idea of where event security fit into
our mix was high on the list. If not the highest, it was certainly
among the top two or three things that we did. Event Security
immediately became, through pronouncement by our
commissioner, the number one priority of the National Football

3

See Jason Wilde, Security to Take Center Stage; Players, Officials, Fans on Alert in
Wake of Terrorist Attacks, WIS. STATE J., Sept. 24, 2001, at C1.
4
See Brian Peterson, Security Is Job 1 With NFL’s Ahlerich, NFL INSIDER, 2002,
http://www.superbowl.com/xxxvi/ce/feature/0,3892,4897815,00.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2003).
5
See generally Molinas v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(upholding then-National Basketball Association [NBA] president’s decision to
indefinitely suspend Jack Molinas, a popular basketball player in the 1950s, for placing
bets on his team, the Pistons).
[I]n order to effectuate its important and legitimate policies against gambling,
and restore and maintain the confidence of the public vital to its existence, . . .
the league was justified in determining that it was absolutely necessary to avoid
even the slightest connection with gambling, gamblers, and those who have
done business with gamblers, in the future.
Id. at 244.
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League.6 He said repeatedly that the NFL could stand a lot of
mistakes; we could make a lot of bad business decisions, we could
have bad business partners, we could have bad problems with our
most important human resources, but we could not, perhaps,
survive a terrorist attack or a large loss of life in one of our venues,
at one of our games.7 That is a very strong statement.
The commissioner formed a task force to deal with security
immediately and to make recommendations to him as well as to all
of the owners as to what should be done to preserve and harden our
events and make them safer.8 He appointed the Task Force of
Stadium Security and Crowd Management Professionals. I was
chair of the committee.9
Over an eight to ten week period the task force met and
evolved into publishing a set of best practices for NFL stadiums
and best practices for security [hereinafter “Best Practices
Guide”].10 Those best practices, in turn, were provided to stadium
managers and owners, recognizing that we do not have direct
control over these venues.11 These venues are owned by cities,
states and in some instances, the team owners themselves.
6

See George, supra note 2 (quoting Ahlerich, explaining, “The commissioner said to
the owners that the No. 1 priority is security and that we are not going to fall short in that
area.”).
7
See Ron Hurst et al., American Sports As a Target of Terrorism: The Duty of Care
After September 11th, http://www.mmwr.com/_uploads/uploaddocs/publications/
american%20sports%20as%20A%20TARGET%20of%20terrorism.pdf (last visited Mar.
25, 2003).
8
See Wilde, supra note 3 (“[C]ommissioner Paul Tagliabue convened a security task
force this week—headed by Ahlerich, who spent [twenty-five] years with the FBI—and
outlined a number of behind-the-scenes security measures.”).
9
Id.
10
See Glauber, supra note 2; Hurst, supra note 7.
In the aftermath of September 11th, most leagues, teams and venues went
through a comprehensive threat assessment and established updated security
guidelines and practices to meet the increased threat. The National Football
League [hereinafter NFL], by way of example, created a security task force and
issued to teams a “best practices guide” [hereinafter Best Practices Guide] of
recommended security measures before resuming play.
Nick Cafardo, Patriots Plan to Play It Safe, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 2001, at E2.
11
See, e.g., Cafardo, supra note 10 (“The NFL has issued guidelines to all teams on
how to proceed with security . . .”); Hurst, supra note 7 (“The National Football
League . . . created a security task force and issued to teams a [Best Practices Guide] of
recommended security measures before resuming play.”).
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That is a commonly misunderstood thing about the NFL, the
idea that it is a hierarchical organization and the Commissioner can
decree what he wants done from Park Avenue. In actuality, he has
limited authority in that area.12 He can urge, he can write some
policies, and if all the owners sign on to it, things can get done.13
And that is exactly what happened here with the Best Practices
Guide.
Then we hired an independent security firm to put together
what I would call an audit, for lack of a better description, to make
an assessment of each stadium to see how they were doing in
actually having best practices performed in their stadiums on nongame day and game day.14 This was an extensive review done by
security professionals, not the NFL Security Department. We hope
they are professional—I believe they are professional—and they
have now been completed and sent back to the teams and will be
provided to the stadiums to implement the recommendations to
ensure that we are doing the very best that we can.
I want to underscore that doing this work, which is expensive,
is not all—well, first and foremost, it is a business decision.15 This
is business. These owners enjoy an important part of the American
scene in entertainment and sports, but they are also in business,
and it is important that their business be preserved. This is
common sense. We are going to preserve our fans and take care of
our fans.
The implementation of the recommendations will be an
interesting project to watch how it goes. Mostly the stadiums have

12

See, e.g., John Clayton, Realignment Ended Up Being Fairly Easy for NFL, ESPN, at
http://espn.go.com/nfl/columns/clayton_john/1203162.html (May 22, 2002) (showing
that a vote by NFL team owners is necessary to alter existing league structure or policy).
13
See, e.g., id. (noting that, due to NFL owners’ willingness to compromise and
bargain, it took only one hour to secure enough votes for the latest realignment of the
thirty-two-team league into eight divisions).
14
See Ted Curtis, Sept. 11 Made Many of Us Reassess, 88 A.B.A. J. 39 (2002) (noting
that Jeff Pash, the NFL’s executive vice president and principal in-house counsel, hired
an independent firm to audit each stadium’s compliance with the anti-terrorism template).
15
See generally Hurst, supra note 7 (considering the prudence of assessing risks and
developing industry best practices for sporting events in order to meet the duty of care for
athlete and fan invitees in the wake of the September 11th tragedy).
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been terrific at it.16 They have taken the Best Practices Guide and
done a very good job—not that I am a judge of the stadiums. I am
not. Mr. Squires will, I am sure, speak to this issue. He is a
professional who runs stadiums.17 I have never run a stadium. We
had some people on the task force who had.
The idea here was to make strong recommendations to the
teams to implement these best practices to the extent possible. The
balancing of the invasive efforts to protect our fans, what might be
considered invasive by some, I think is an important area that
needs to be discussed. How far can we go with physical searches?
How much permission is needed as fans enter the stadium to
protect the fans at large and our business? Our experience has
been since September 11th enormous acceptance and help from the
public and our fans. The complaints that we have received have
been along two lines, if you were to characterize them. Number
one: you are not doing enough; why are you not doing more?18
And number two: you are not consistent.19 We did not get that
everyplace, but we would occasionally receive those complaints.
I will end with my comment as to our biggest concern in going
forward, and that is very simple. It is complacency. We are
vigilant and we are going to push as hard as we can to do the right
thing to protect our fans, but we understand that complacency
could be our largest issue as we go forward with our fans, stadium
managers, owners, and those who would spend the money to make
us more secure.20
Thank you.
16

See, e.g., Tom Withers, Browns Security Director Says Fans Safe, HOLLAND
SENTINEL (Mich.), Sept. 20, 2001, http://www.thehollandsentinel.net/stories/092101/
spo_0921010055.shtml.
17
See generally infra notes 22–55 and accompanying text.
18
See David Firestone, In Security Matters, Playing Field Is Level, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
2002, at D8 (quoting an NFL fan enthusiastic about the extent of searches: “‘I’ve never
been searched like this in my life—isn’t it great?’”).
19
See id. (quoting an NFL fan who was concerned with consistency: “They said it was
everybody, and it had better be.”).
20
See Steve Cameron, Venues Revisit Safety vs. Cost As September 11th Recedes,
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 11–17, 2002, at 1 (noting that as few as six
months after the September 11th tragedies, some sports facility managers were
considering decreasing or abandoning some of the enhanced security measures enacted to
protect their venues against terrorism).
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PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much.
Before we go to the next speaker, I wonder if you could just
clarify one thing. That is, you said that the NFL has issued
recommendations involving best practices.
MR. AHLERICH: Yes.
PROFESSOR FALLON: Then you also said that one of the big
issues is how far it is appropriate to go, especially with respect to
searches.
MR. AHLERICH: Yes.
PROFESSOR FALLON: What does the Best Practices Guide
say about searches?
MR. AHLERICH: It recommends that for a bag, or any items
required into the stadium, we would request and receive a consent
search from all patrons as they would come in, all fans.21 That is
recommended.
The idea is to have a strong, careful visual inspection of the
patrons before they come in, as well as a touching or patting of the
outer garments.
PROFESSOR FALLON: And if somebody refuses permission,
then presumably that person does not get into the stadium?
MR. AHLERICH: That is correct.
PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much.
So now, Mr. Squires, as with Milton Ahlerich, you have a lot
of experience in the sports business and in stadium security, so I
hope that you will talk about whatever you think would be most
interesting to the audience, but I hope too that you will specifically
respond to issues about how your concerns have changed since
September 11th, what you are doing about those concerns, and
maybe specifically what you are doing with the Best Practices
Guide given to you by the NFL.
MR. SQUIRES: Sure.
21

Hurst, supra note 7 (noting that the NFL’s Best Practices Guide recommends “use of
hand held metal detectors and search of all small bags and personal items”). See also Eric
Fisher, NFL Promises ‘Unprecedented’ Commitment to Fan Safety, WASH. TIMES, Sept.
21, 2001, at C10.
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I am assuming we have all Jets and Giants fans in here, right?
Any Cowboys fans? Do not identify yourself.
Giants Stadium is twenty-six years young this year.22 We have
had 48 million people come through our gates.23 I know this is a
sports symposium, but we have had the Pope,24 we have had more
concerts than people can imagine,25 we have Major League
Soccer,26 the North American Soccer League,27 and the New
Jersey Generals.28
I like to think that my staff is probably the best in the business
at what they do. Giants Stadium is the busiest non-baseball
stadium in the country;29 2.63 million people came through our
turnstiles last year,30 the second-best year we have ever had. We
netted about $18 million.31 It was a great year for us.
22

New York Giants, Game Day: Giants Stadium, at http://www.giants.com/facility
(last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (noting the date of the Giants’ debut in Giants Stadium as
Oct. 10, 1976).
23
Giants Stadium Fast Facts, at http://www.meadowlands.com/stadium/fastfacts.asp
(n.d.).
24
See Glauber, supra note 2; Edward Wong, Guard Is Up for Stadium Security
Officials Across the Country, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at D8 (noting that Giants
Stadium already had a blueprint for heightened security, as measures had been enhanced
during “the Persian Gulf War, a 1995 visit by Pope John Paul II and the 1994 World
Cup”).
25
See, e.g., Welcome to the Meadowlands Sports Complex, Meadowlands, at
www.meadowlands.com (n.d.). See the main page and “Event Calendar” for a schedule
of competitions and concerts. Id.
26
Giants Stadium Fast Facts, supra note 23 (noting the past and present tenants of
Giants Stadium including the New York/New Jersey Metrostars (MSL)(1996–present),
New Jersey Cosmos (NASL)(1977–85) and the New Jersey Generals (USFL)(1983–85)).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See John Brennan, Turf’s Up at the Meadowlands, RECORD (Begen County, N.J.),
Dec. 31, 2002, at S5 (quoting George Zoffinger, president of the New Jersey Sports and
Exhibition Authority: “Giants Stadium is the busiest stadium in the country with two
NFL teams and a Major League Soccer team [the MetroStars] as well as numerous
concerts and other events.”).
30
See NEW JERSEY SPORTS & EXPOSITION AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2001)
(noting that the 2001 total attendance for Giants Stadium and Continental Arena Airlines
combined was over 4 million), http://www.njsea.com/Offers/pdf/NJSEA2001AnnRpt.
pdf.
31
See Associated Press, Metro Briefing New Jersey: Trenton: State Aid for
Meadowlands to Drop, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at F4 (announcing 2001’s net
revenue at $17.5 million).
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Before September 11th safety was our paramount concern, and
it is even more paramount now, if you can believe that. I look at
security as a good boxing referee: you know he is there, but you do
not see him a lot.32
Has anybody been to any events at Giants Stadium since
September 11th?
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANTS: Yes.
MR. SQUIRES: What we have done is major deterrence.33 As
you come through the toll plazas, you see state police cars out
there. We now do our checks outside the gates rather than inside
the gates, and inside that corral area are state police.34 When you
come through the turnstiles, the first thing you see are state police
cars. When you go to your seat, you see state police walking
around the concourse, which is something we have not done
before.35 So it is a deterrent for anybody who may think that we
might be an easy target.
It costs $40,000 more per game to do that. There are other
things that are included in that—which the Jets and the Giants do
not participate in. The New Jersey Sports and Exposition
Authority, which owns and governs Giants Stadium, pays for
that.36 But you cannot put a price tag on a life—well, I guess

32

See Glauber, supra note 2.
See id.; Wong, supra note 24 (noting that Giants Stadium sits “across the Hudson
River from the . . . World Trade Center” and commenting that for weekend football
games, “There will be more people with guns and uniforms there . . . than at some
minimum security prisons.”).
34
See generally Wong, supra note 24 (explaining that “[t]he Meadowlands uses inhouse security guards and the New Jersey State Police to staff events” and that their
numbers would be increased and their presence would be more visible in response to the
heightened security threat).
35
See generally id.
36
See New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, Meadowlands Sports Complex
Calculates $3.2 Million Negative Impact From World Trade Center Attack, at
http://www.njsea.com/SearchResult/SearchResultDetails.asp (Nov. 28, 2001). See also
Leonard Shapiro, NFL Is Making Plans for Super Bowl Security, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,
2001, at D5 (describing NFL owners and NFL Players Association discussions about
sharing the increased costs of providing additional security in response to September
11th); Wong, supra note 24 (noting that the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority
runs Giants Stadium).
33
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maybe the Navy can; I think it’s $330,000 for lost life—but I
cannot put a price tag on a life at my stadium.37
My goal is to get fans there, make sure they enjoy their
experience and make sure they get home safely. If I accomplish
that twenty times a year, I am 20–0.
Milt and I have worked closely together. We’re fortunate.
Because we are in New York, we have the NFL out there all the
time. Because we are in New York, the Major League Soccer
Commissioner is out there a lot. I do not consider that pressure. I
consider that a good thing. I think when Milt came out he saw that
we took this seriously and we did the best we could, and I think we
have done a terrific job.
I agree with him; complacency is an issue.38 I was recently
interviewed for an article in Street & Smith’s Sports Business
Journal, and two of my compatriots in this country agreed with me
that complacency and being on the tip of the spear and really
watching what we are doing is important.39 There was a comment
from a so-called terrorist expert who says if we are focused on
terrorism five years from now in the sports business, then there is
something wrong.40 I told that person, “Why don’t you come and
live in New Jersey and look at that skyline every day and you tell
me differently.”41
Nothing good came out of September 11th, and I cannot use
enough adjectives that can describe that, but one by-product is that
my staff will never get complacent on my watch. It will not
happen. Every time they do, I just take them to one of my spirals

37
All members of the uniformed services are offered insurance under Servicemembers’
Group Life Insurance for the maximum amount of $250,000. See Servicemembers’
Group
Life
Insurance
(SGLI),
at
http://www.military.com/Resources/
ResourceFileView?file=VETERANS_LIFE_INSURANCE_SGLI.HTM (last visited
Mar. 16, 2003).
38
See Cameron, supra note 20; Thomas George, League to Increase Security at
Stadiums, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2002, § 8, at 6.
39
See Cameron, supra note 20.
40
Id.
41
Id. See also Wong, supra note 24.
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that face southern Manhattan42 and I say, “Take a look and what
don’t you see anymore?”
If you read my bio, you know I went to the United States Naval
Academy. I am still in the Reserves. I strongly believe in this
country. I strongly believe in the people who come visit my
facility. And it is not just my facility. You know, we are in the
business of selling entertainment: I have an arena, I have a race
track, and I want people to enjoy themselves coming to my
stadium, feel safe, and then maybe buy a ticket to go to the race
track or go to the arena for a hockey game or a basketball game.
Going to the safety of our guests—in the past, we did a bottle
and cans check.43 We would open up bags or we would have the
guest open up the bag to show us what they had. We would not
touch it. We would let them fumble through the bag and show us
what was in there.
Since September 11th, it has been an amazing transformation.
The guests want us to search them. My philosophy is that I do not
know that they want us to search them as much as they want to
make sure that we are searching the people on their left and right.
And I am telling you we have done it, and we have not had one
phone call.
A couple of issues we had where we made some mistakes were
male guards searching females—and I mean searching.44 It is not a
head-to-toe, you know, get up against the wall. It is like Milt said:
open your jacket, let us go through your bag. We corrected that.
The phone calls that we have received have been exactly what
Milt has said, that we have not been consistent enough and we are
42

See generally Frank Litsky, Jumpy Giants Welcome a Respite and the Chance to
Pitch In, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at C8 (noting the view of the lower Manhattan
skyline from the Giants Stadium complex).
43
Giants Stadium Expands Security Procedures; Fans Encouraged to Enter Stadium
Early, at www.giants.com/facility/index.cfm?cont_id=76702 (Oct. 4, 2001) (“The
existing policy of prohibiting bottles (glass or plastic), cans, umbrellas, video
cameras/recording devices or any items deemed by management to be dangerous or
inappropriate remains in effect.”).
44
See, e.g., Rhoda Amon, On the Go, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb. 17, 2002, at E3
(discussing female travelers’ complaints of “being ‘touched inappropriately’ by male
screeners” following security increases in the wake of September 11th).
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probably not searching as well as they would like us to search
them.
That being said, we are going to continue. I have Major
League Soccer starting next Saturday.45 We have a place called
Checkpoint Charlie—I mean, you would think we are back in
Vietnam.46 It is an area where there is a straight drive-through into
the west end of the Stadium.47 We have put up yellow Jersey
Barriers, we have state police out there with their suburban
vehicles and we have two bomb-sniffing dogs.48
This past year, a New York Jet by the name of Damien
Robinson unfortunately forgot that he had an assault rifle in the
trunk of his car and our dog found it.49 He was fined $30,000 by
the team—I think it was by the team.50 He still has not gone to
court yet.51 But it just goes to show you that there are no
exceptions to this rule.
We do not allow anything into the gate. We allow women’s
purses. We allow diaper bags, but there better be a baby with that
diaper bag. We do not regulate the size of the purse, although we
do not want you bringing one of those big old beach bags.
It is not just that we are concerned about a suspicious item
being in that bag, but if the bag is left under a water fountain, just
45

MetroStars, MetroStars Schedule—April 2002, at http://www.metrostars.com/
schedule/april.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2003) (noting that the Metrostars 2002 opening
game versus the Chicago Fire was played on April 20, 2002).
46
See generally Michael Vega, It’s a Tight Ship at Stadium, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20,
2001, at E7 (explaining that “Checkpoint Charlie” seems to be a derivative of “Defcon
Charlie,” the code name for the second highest state of security alert at the United States
Naval Academy).
47
See Glauber, supra note 2 (noting that the Giants Stadium practice of closing some
entrances off to route traffic for security purposes).
48
See generally Wong, supra note 24 (discussing security measures taken at Giants
Stadium).
49
Ken Berger, Weapons Arrest for Jet; Assault Rifle, Ammunition Found in Back of
Robinson’s SUV, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 17, 2001, at A76; Mike Freeman, Pro Football:
Inside NFL: Some Players Arming Themselves for Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, § 8,
at 7.
50
Berger, supra note 49 (“Jets coach Herman Edwards, after consulting the NFL
commissioner’s office, fined Robinson $30,000.”).
51
See Jim Litke, Leniency for NFL Troublemakers Wrong, HAMILTON SPECTATOR
(Ont.), Nov. 9, 2001, at E5 (“The case against Damien Robinson is still pending.”).
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inadvertently left and forgotten, in this heightened security, if
somebody sees that and says, “Oh my God, an abandoned bag,”
and before you know it, people are running out of the stadium, and
all it is a sweatshirt and a set of binoculars, that is our biggest
concern.52 That is a huge concern.
We have had two strange instances—not strange, but just two
stupid things on people’s parts that have really shown me the
attention to detail.
We had a gentleman come to the gates. He had something that
we requested he return to his car. He did not want to walk all the
way back to his car. He went up to a woman who was parking her
car in the general vicinity and said, “Could you please put this in
your car and after the game I will come and get it from your car?”
She said, “Absolutely not.” He took the item, threw it under a car,
and one of my security guards saw it. Within minutes, the state
police were out there, the area was taped off, we have dogs53—I
mean, we take everything very seriously.
The next instance involved a guy who was coming to the gates
with a cooler. He was informed he could not bring his cooler in.
He had a thermos. He gave the thermos to his wife and said,
“Here, honey, you take the bomb in.” Well, within five minutes,
he was down in the state police office. We released him. We
warned him. We talked to the team about the ticket holder. There is
no joking. It is not a joking matter. And, as Milt said, the guests
are the ones who really want us to continue to provide the security.
The biggest issue we still have is aviation. The phrase “no fly
zone” came out very early on after September 11th around
stadiums.54 If you have ever flown into Newark—and I think that
52

See, e.g., Douglas Futch et al., Hearsfield Security: Reaction, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Nov. 18, 2001, at 9A (describing the panic and complete shutdown of Chicago’s O’Hare
Airport after a traveler forgot his camera bag in the terminal and left without retrieving it
out of fear of missing his flight).
53
Bryan Burwell, Sports Aren’t Immune to Threat of Terror That Lurks Everywhere,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, at B1 (“Rifle-toting state troopers with bomb-sniffing dogs
ring Giant Stadium for every sporting event.”).
54
Tom Bowman et al., Terrorism Strikes America: The Response, BALT. SUN, Sept. 21,
2001, at 1A (“[T]he Federal Aviation Administration enacted a defensive measure at
home, declaring a ‘no-fly zone’ within three miles of major professional and college
sporting events.”).
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everybody has—if you ever sat on the port side of the airplane and
looked out the window—“port” is a Navy term for left55—if you
look out there and you look down, you see Giants Stadium. I have
had people call me and tell me that aviation should ban all flights
on Sundays because of the NFL. I try to explain to them that the
NFL is big but the aviation industry is just a little bit bigger.
But as time has gone on, it has gotten easier and easier for us.
My concern is—and we are lucky—Giants Stadium is not like
some of the NFL facilities that all they do is play NFL games. I
have soccer starting up, I will have some concerts this summer,56 I
will do all my emergency evacuation drills, all my fire drills, I will
do my training, so on August 5th, our first preseason game
between the Giants and the Houston Texans, we will be ready. It
is those teams that maybe perform thirteen to fourteen events a
year, that have a six-month hiatus between their last game and their
next game, they are the ones I really think that have to
continuously train and emphasize. And we do have that skyline to
look at, so it makes it a little easier for my staff to understand why
it is so important.
PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much.
If I could, again, just ask one small clarificatory question: both
you and Mr. Ahlerich have alluded to some complaints or concerns
about consistency with respect to which practices designed to
ensure security are applied. Now, I could imagine two kinds of
concerns about consistency. One would be that you do not look
hard enough at everybody. The other kind of concern would be
that you look in some sense too hard, you single out some group of
people, possibly on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, whatever it
might be. Which or both of these kinds of complaints have you
had and how valid do you regard the complaints as being?
MR. AHLERICH: We have had nothing forwarded to the
League Office that said that anyone was singled out. The
complaints were more, “I was searched more thoroughly than I
saw other people being searched.” We have received that. Then
55

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000)
(defining port as “the left-hand side of a ship or aircraft facing forward”).
56
See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
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we received, “I walked right in. I walked in and they did not look
through my bag very well. What kind of security is that?” Those
are the two types that I have seen.
MR. SQUIRES: I agree. There have not been any instances of
profiling at all. It has been, “Well, I saw somebody get in with a
bag and the bag was oversized,” or we had a situation early on
where we did not have the appropriate female guards at the gates to
search females, so we would not touch them, for sure, but we let
them in without doing the search that we were doing to other male
guests. Those are the inconsistencies we have had.
PROFESSOR FALLON: Now Paul Zoubek. I know one of the
things I would be interested in is your reaction to what is being
done by the NFL, what is being done at Giants Stadium. If these
were your clients, how would you advise them? Are they doing
enough, too much, or ought they to be doing something else? How
do you react to what you have heard?
MR. ZOUBEK: I think what we need to focus on is the need to
balance the continuing threat of terrorism with the need to get back
to business. But that is one of the most difficult questions we, as a
nation, have ever faced.
As an interesting segue on the last topic that was mentioned by
Bill, for all of us, much like when Kennedy was shot, we will
always talk about where we were on September 11th.57 I was
chairing a panel of community members and law enforcement on
how to eradicate racial profiling in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
With us at the time was the Chief of Police of Port Authority and
the Chief of Police of Montgomery County, Virginia. We had to
helicopter both of them out of the conference.
I then spent time as First Assistant Attorney General working
on New Jersey’s reaction to the attack. Our immediate questions
were: “What do we do now? What do we do next? What are our
57

See generally Vivian Berger, Every Generation Faces Its Moment of Truth, NAT’L L.
J., Sept. 24, 2001, at A26; Marie Cocco, Respect and Sorrow, RECORD (Bergen County,
N.J.), Sept. 11, 2002 (“September 11 was not like Pearl Harbor. It was more like the day
JFK was shot. . . . JFK’s death is the touchstone that people reach for, an instinctive
connection made without conscious thought. It was a cataclysmic event that was
incomprehensible, yet comprehended immediately as innocence lost.”).
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threats? What targets do we need to harden?” As part of the
immediate response, state troopers and National Guard were sent
to guard the nuclear reactors, and to the vents of the Holland
Tunnel.58
At that point in time, what did we know? We knew we had
just suffered the worst attack on domestic soil in our history.59 But
we did not know what was the next target, so what we had to do
was undertake a total assessment of all the potential targets in New
Jersey, ranking them, and deploying the available resources to
meet those potential threats.60
During that same period of time the NFL and stadium owners
were conducting their threat assessments and determining what
they needed to do.
Well, here we are six months later. Thankfully, we have routed
the Taliban, but Osama bin Laden is at large.61 We have not had
any further anthrax incidents, but we also have not caught the
evildoer at fault.62
I think what we have learned is that one of our greatest threats
is complacency. We should not only focus on the missing World
Trade Center as a symbol to remind us of the threat but we should
also recognize that New Jersey and New York have been a
58

See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Pennsylvania Governor Mark Schweiker,
Governor Calls Up National Guard to Secure Nuclear Facilities Through Wednesday,
Nov. 7 (Nov. 2, 2001) (announcing the deployment of the Pennsylvania National Guard
to guard Pennsylvania’s nuclear power plants), http://www.pahouse.com/veon/
schweikerrelease.htm; News Release, New Jersey Department of Military & Veterans
Affairs [NJDMAVA], NJDMAVA Deploys to New Jersey Conference of Mayors (May
1, 2002), http://www.state.nj.us/military/news/archive2002/1may02njdmavadeploys.
html.
59
See George Vecsey, The Mayor Was There For the Yanks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6 ,
2001 (quoting Mayor Rudy Giuliani, identifying the September 11, 2001 attacks as “the
worst attack in the history of our country”).
60
See Bill Gertz & Rowan Scarborough, Nation: Inside the Ring, WASH. TIMES, Dec.
27, 2002, at A7.
61
Pursuing bin Laden, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 11, 2002, at A16 (noting that Americans
are frustrated that, despite the defeat of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, bin Laden remains at
large).
62
The Nation; FBI Laments Lack of Anthrax Arrests, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002, at A25
(“FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III expressed dissatisfaction . . . that those responsible
for last year’s deadly anthrax attacks had not yet been caught.”).
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breeding ground for terrorists, New Jersey in particular. In the
1993 bombing some of the terrorists were from Jersey City and in
the most recent attack, some had lived in Patterson.63
So what do we know about our threat? I think we know that it
is a real and continuing threat. And I think we have to recognize
that it is a threat that challenges our very existence as a nation.
What we really have to do—and one of the statements I heard from
some of the heads of our Emergency Management in New Jersey I
think is very apropos: “We have to establish security as a way of
life.”
Last night, when my flight from Detroit was canceled, all the
passengers on my flight had to go to the other end of the airport
from USAir terminal to the Delta terminal. All sixty of us then had
to line up to be searched. The flight was delayed two hours, I did
not hear a peep from anyone. They were all thankful that that was
occurring.
But how do we balance the continuing threat that we know we
have against the cost of continuing some of the measures that the
NFL and some of the stadiums have been involved in?
I really think what the NFL and some of the stadiums have
done is absolutely what has been needed to be done, which is
conduct a threat assessment, look where you can meet some of
your potential vulnerabilities and establish a policy like Best
Practices for your particular industry.64
Next, you have to educate the public as to what those practices
are, because the public will be cooperative. If you are doing
63

Joseph Grinstein, Jihad and the Constitution: The First Amendment Implications of
Combating Religiously Motivated Terrorism, 105 YALE L.J. 1347, 1348–49 (1996)
(identifying the terrorists at fault in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing as being New
Jersey residents); Aaron Brown, The Anthrax Investigation, CNN Transcripts, at
http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/16/asb.00.html (Oct. 16, 2001) (reporting
that some of the suspected hijackers stayed in a Patterson, New Jersey, apartment before
the attacks).
64
See Hurst, supra note 7 (“In the aftermath of September 11th, most leagues, teams
and venues went through a comprehensive threat assessment and established updated
security guidelines and practices to meet the increased threat. The [NFL] . . . issued to
teams a [Best Practices Guide] of recommended security measures before resuming
play.”); Andrew Mason, Security: NFL’s “No. 1 Priority”, NFL News, at
http://www.nfl.com/news/2001/security_092001.html (Sept. 20, 2001).
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searches across the board and you are announcing them, I think
that it will be accepted and appropriate.
Obviously, as someone who was very much involved in some
of the New Jersey State Police racial profiling issues and the
reforms in New Jersey, we cannot let this threat become a new
impetus, like the War on Drugs was, for instances of racial
profiling on a security threat.65 I think the measures that have been
set up, that are set up across the board at the facilities, are the
appropriate way to go.
American sports is a very symbolic target of terrorism because
it is so associated with the globalization of the American economy
and the American culture.66 Young kids throughout the world are
wearing those jerseys, they are wearing their Nike shirts, their Nike
shoes, and the terrorists are looking for a symbol to target. That is
why so much effort was put in at the Olympics.67 That is why so
much effort was put in at the Super Bowl and at some of the larger
events.68 What we have to do is just establish security as a way of
life.69
I would submit that if your clients do not establish and follow
the Best Practices Guide, they will have substantial issues as it
relates to the duty of care that they owe to the participants and to
the spectators.70
65

See Nicole Davis, The Slippery Slope of Racial Profiling: From the War on Drugs to
the War on Terrorism, Color Lines, at *2, at http://www.arc.org/C_Lines/CLArchive/
story2001_12_05.html (Dec. 2001) (reporting that eighty percent of American citizens
opposed racial profiling prior to September 11th, but seventy percent of citizens now
believe some form of racial profiling may be necessary).
66
See, e.g., Roy Masters, Super Bowl Gets Peak Rating As Terrorists Target Audience,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 2, 2002 (referring to the Super Bowl as “the citadel of
American commercialism” and as a potential terrorist target).
67
Patrick O’Driscoll, Bottom Line on $310 M Security: Few Arrests, Games Wrap Up
Safely, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2002, at 4D (“The Winter Olympics bought the best
security that $310 million could buy. In the end, it worked.”).
68
Brian Schmitz, Security Keeps Game Safe, Sound; The Well-Coordinated Massive
Effort Ranked As Unprecedented for a U.S. Sporting Event, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 4,
2002, at C6 (noting that the “tightest security measures ever for a sporting event in the
United States” were in place for Super Bowl XXXVI in the wake of the September 11th
terror attacks).
69
See Cameron, supra note 20.
70
See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 709 (Cal. 1992) (team owner liability);
Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice Skating Center, Inc. 777 A.2d 380 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.

1 - PANEL I FORMAT

2003]

4/15/03 9:25 AM

LEGAL ISSUES IN SPORTS SECURITY

367

I think that the measures that have been put in place so far have
been reasonable. I think one of the issues we have to focus on, as
we look at issues with respect to facial recognition technology is
potential effectiveness of the technology.
If you have a “be on the lookout” alert that a suspected member
of the Al-Qaeda is nearby in a particular location, I think it would
be very reasonable to engage in facial recognition or other
technology to try to identify whether that individual has infiltrated
a facility. A more generalized facial recognition program that does
not rely on some targeting based upon realistic information may be
more questionable.
So I think it is something that we have to check on. And I can
tell you, as someone who has handed flags and urns to the family
members of New Jersey residents who were lost, I think we all
want to make sure that we have learned from this incident.
And we are making sure that this comment that you referred to
from Street & Smith’s,71 that in five years from now if we are still
doing this, then people are making a mistake—I take the absolute
contrary view, which is, for my children, for my grandchildren, we
have to establish this as a way of life and just accept the reasonable
intrusion consistent with our constitutional principles.
PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much.
Norman Siegel, I am sure you have a number of things to say
and a number of things in response to what has been said.
MR. SIEGEL: The horrific attack on the World Trade Center
and the deaths of almost 3,000 innocent people on September 11,
2001,72 changed America and the world, perhaps for our lifetime.
It has put our basic security into question and is now forcing us to
consider issues of freedom and security, liberty, and order.
The challenge facing us—and I think I agree with Paul at least
in what he said—is to find a balance, a balance that protects our
Div. 2001) (hockey rink not liable for failing to eradicate risk of spectators in bleachers
getting hit by errant pucks); Hurst, supra note 7.
71
See Cameron, supra note 20.
72
A Day of Terror; Bush’s Remarks to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2001, at A4 (quoting President George W. Bush’s address to the nation the
evening of September 11th).
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safety while preserving the principles of freedom that are such an
integral part of our national spirit. I submit that we need not
choose between safety and freedom.
The Declaration of Independence described life and liberty as
inalienable rights.73
The Constitution declares that it was
established both to “provide for the common defense” and “to
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”74
In the difficult times ahead—and I think they are and will be
difficult—we must continue to look to our Constitution as a beacon
to guide us as we struggle to defend the principles for which it
stands. These times require that we be ever vigilant, ever
outspoken, and ever strong in protecting freedom.
The specific topic before us this morning is “Legal Issues in
Sports Security.” This issue was fundamentally affected by the
September 11th attack, but the issue had already surfaced preSeptember 11th. At a minimum, legal and, if I may add, policy,
issues in sports security had arisen, for example, at the 1996
Atlanta Summer Olympics,75 as well as the 2001 Super Bowl in
Tampa.76
This morning Mr. Ahlerich informed me that some of the
public information regarding the Super Bowl in Tampa is incorrect
and that the facial recognition was not in the stadium but was, if I
understand him correctly—if not, correct me now—in the NFL
Experience77 that was taking place adjacent to the stadium itself
and in a walkway from that facility to the stadium.78
As a minor point, I would recommend when there are public
debates on these issues, if in fact the public debates are not
73

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
75
Derek Jensen, Security’s Tight, Relentless, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Feb. 17,
2002 at A1.
76
See Tampa Installs High-Tech Security Cameras, USA TODAY, July 7, 2001.
77
See Taking in Tampa, ABC News, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/sports/
DailyNews/superbowl_tampaguide_010118.html (Jan. 19, 2001) (“Open from January
20th to the 28th [of 2001], the NFL Experience is a 20-acre interactive football-related
theme park set in tents and open areas adjacent to Raymond James Stadium.”).
78
Jeanne Bonner, Looking for Faces in the Super Bowl Crowd, Security Solutions, at
http://www.securitysolutions.com/ar/security_looking_faces_super (Mar. 1, 2001).
74
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accurate, then people should jump-in and give the correct
information. It is silly to have a public debate about an issue if, in
fact, the facts are not accurate.
Since September 11th, the topic arose, at a minimum, in the
2001World Series opener at Yankee Stadium,79 the 2002 Super
Bowl in New Orleans80 and the 2002 Winter Olympics.81
The specific issue is: how do we as a democratic society
committed to the principles and values of free movement, privacy,
equality, and fairness provide adequate security and safety at
public sporting events? The challenge for all of us is to craft and
implement—implement is very important—an appropriate balance.
I also ask questions. For example, when the task force was set
up, were there any civil rights or civil liberties people on that task
force?82 Were there any people from the community? Were
people from the NAACP or the Urban League83 or the Puerto
Rican Legal Defense Fund84 invited to participate in these
discussions?
It seems to me that, since sports is a business, business and
management techniques should be inclusive so that we have the
dialogue up-front, rather than the confrontations later on, on these
very difficult issues. I hope the answers to my questions are in the
affirmative.
Finding that appropriate balance might be difficult. It might be
okay theoretically, but then implementation is “a whole other
ballgame,” to use that metaphor.

79

See Bill Griffith, Good Memories Come to Mind Overflowing with Magic Moments,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 2002, at E7.
80
Hunter S. Thompson, For What It’s Worth, ESPN, at http://www.espn.go.com/
page2/s/thompson/020305.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2003).
81
Brice Wallace, Biometrics Is New Wave of Identification Technology, DESERT NEWS
(Salt Lake City), Dec. 18, 2002 (“Facial recognition technology . . . was nearly put to
work during the 2002 Olympic Winter Games. . . . before the Salt Lake Organizing
Committee turned thumbs down to the venture.”).
82
See Wilde supra note 3; text accompanying note 9.
83
See About Us; Mission Statement, National Urban League, at http://www.nul.org/
about/mission.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
84
About “PEARL-DEF”, Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Educucation Fund, at
www.prldef.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
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But we cannot, and should not be non-thoughtful, expedient,
exclusive, or even glib, about this growing issue of public concern.
Interestingly enough, I would agree with the speakers so far
that if in fact five years from now this is not a major concern, then
we have been irresponsible.
As a result of a bomb exploding at the Atlanta Olympics,85
entrance to the sporting events was contingent upon going through
a metal detector and surveillance of handbags, backpacks, and
bags.86 The 2000 Tampa Super Bowl, with the addition of the
NFL Experience, introduced face recognition software technology
to sporting events, at least publicly.87 Who knows if it was taking
place previously? We do not know that. The software reportedly
digitized the facial images of fans in an attempt to match them with
“mug shots” of people in a criminal database.88
The 2001 World Series opening game at Yankee Stadium
introduced metal detectors, and I believe metal scanners, as a
condition to watching a baseball game.89 I believe the 2002 New
Orleans Super Bowl and the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics
continued the practice of metal detectors and metal scanners.90
85

Jensen, supra note 75 (“[I]t was eight days into the last Olympics held on U.S. soil
when a bomb exploded in Atlanta’s Centennial Park, killing one woman and injuring
scores” of by-standers.).
86
Eric Harrison & Robin Wright, More Troops Sent to Atlanta As Bomb Threats
Increase, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2996, at A1 (“[T]he Georgia National Guard . . . [sent] an
additional infantry battalion to the Games to help handbag-searches, metal detector
operators and guards.”).
87
Robert Trigaux, Cameras Scanned Fans for Criminals, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Fla.), Jan. 31, 2001, at A1 (noting that Sunday’s Super Bowl was the first major sporting
event to adopt face matching surveillance system). See also Lev Grossman, Welcome to
the Snooper Bowl; Big Brother Came to Super Sunday, Setting Off a New Debate About
Privacy and Security in the Digital Age, TIME, Feb. 12, 2001, at 72 (noting that the
Tampa Bay police department (with the full cooperation of the NFL) used the FaceTrac
surveillance system at the Super Bowl in Tampa).
88
Todd R. Weiss, ACLU Slams Facial Recognition Software, CNN, at http://www.cnn.
com/2002/TECH/ptech/01/08/aclu.face.recognition.idg/?related (Jan. 8, 2002).
89
See Mike Lopresti, From the Press Box: Stadium Security Tight in Today’s New
World, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 2001.
90
Mary Foster, Long Walks Among Extra Super Bowl Security, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan.
29, 2002 (“Fans, vendors, media and VIPS will all be subject to thorough searches that
could include X-ray machines, metal detectors and pat-downs.”). See also Jessica Reaves,
Olympic Security: Life on High Alert: Terror Doesn’t Scare the Folks in Salt Lake, Who
Are Adjusting Well to Living with Hourlong Security Delays, TIME, Feb. 12, 2002.
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First and foremost are the concerns regarding facial recognition
software video surveillance. To begin the analysis we must ask
ourselves what security benefits the proposed technology will
bring. The burden of proof is on the proponent of the specific
proposed technology. She or he must demonstrate that the
proposed technology will actually make us safer.
Applying this approach to the facial recognition technology,
we find out that the technology, though inviting in theory, does not
seem to work. In a November 2001 statement, the American Civil
Liberties Union said: “Facial recognition software is easily tripped
up by change in hair style or facial hair, by aging, weight gain or
loss and by simple disguise.”91
In a November 20, 2001 press release the ACLU said, “A study
by the Department of Defense found very high error rates even
under ideal conditions where the subject is staring directly into the
camera under bright lights.”92 The study found very high rates of
both false-positives93 (which was defined as wrongly matching
people with photos of others) and false-negatives94 (defined as not
catching people in the database). That suggests that, if installed,
these systems “would miss a high proportion of suspects included
in the photo database and flag huge numbers of innocent people—
thereby lessening vigilance, wasting precious manpower resources,
and creating a false sense of security.”95
Moreover, as the November 2001 statement pointed out that
several government agencies “have abandoned facial recognition
91

ACLU, ACLU Opposes Use of Face Recognition Software in Airports Due to
Ineffectiveness and Privacy Concerns, at http://archive.aclu.org/features/f110101a.html
(last visited Mar. 16, 2003).
92
Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Calls on Fresno Airport to Remove Controversial
Facial Recognition Technology, (Nov. 20, 2001), http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.
cfm?ID=9262&c=39.
93
See DUANE BLACKBURN ET AL., FACIAL RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST 2000:
EVALUATION REPORT (2001), http://www.dodcounterdrug.com/facialrecognition/DLs/
FRVT_2000.pdf. See also P. Jonathon Phillips et al., An Introduction to Evaluating
Biometric Systems, COMPUTER, Feb. 2000, at 56, http://www.dodcounterdrug.com/
facialrecognition/DLs/Feret7.pdf; Jay Stanley & Barry Steinhardt, Drawing a Blank: The
Failure of Facial Recognition Technology in Tampa, Florida, ACLU, at http://archive.
aclu.org/issues/privacy/ drawing_blank.pdf (Jan. 3, 2002).
94
Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 93.
95
Press Release, supra note 92.
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systems after finding they did not work as advertised, including the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, which experimented with
using the technology to identify people in cars at the Mexico-U.S.
border.”96
The ACLU concluded that “it is abundantly clear that the
security benefits of such an approach would be minimal to
nonexistent for a very simple reason: the technology does not
work.”97
Let me just highlight some issues, and then maybe in questions
I can go into more detail.
I think there are going to be more video surveillance cameras
in general.98 I believe I read somewhere in one of the New York
sports pages that Yankee Stadium is going to be putting in more
video surveillance cameras. I would not be surprised if major
sports venues such as Madison Square Garden, Staples Center,
Giants Stadium, and the Meadowlands begin to use the video
surveillance technology.
I think we need to develop guidelines. Perhaps there should be
a task force including the people that I mentioned.
We do not oppose video surveillance as a general proposition
or an absolute opposition. The opposition usually comes with the
fact that there are no guidelines, there is very often nonexistent or
inadequate signage, and there are objections when the video stays
in perpetuity.
As a general proposition, if someone is using video
surveillance for criminal activity, if, let us say, after seventy-two
hours in observation, there is no criminal activity on the video, the
video should be destroyed or erased. We do not want a permanent
government, private, or government/private database of innocent
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ACLU, supra note 91. See also Stefanie Olsen & Robert Lemos, Can Face
Recognition Keep Airports Safe?, CNet, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023275313.html?tag=rn (Nov. 1, 2001).
97
ACLU, supra note 91. See also Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 93.
98
See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, Video Surveillance Planned on Mall, WASH. POST, Mar.
22, 2002, at A1.
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Americans being filed somewhere in some Orwellian 1984
situation.99
There are also questions of metal detectors. In an interesting
way, Logan Airport on the morning of September 11th makes the
case as strong as possible that metal detectors in some interesting
way are obsolete. The terror hijackers used plastic knives. The
metal detector only detects metal. So there has to be further
discussion, again in the context of potential false security.
My experience on racial—and now national origin—profiling
is that everybody in the universe takes the position that there is no
racial profiling. Just the other day, the NYPD [the New York
Police Department] said, “Never has been, isn’t, but we’re putting
out a statement anyway to prohibit it.”100 It is like censorship:
there are no censors and nobody engages in censorship. Nobody
engages in racial profiling, yet it does, has and probably will
continue, because just issuing a proclamation or having the head of
the organization say the right thing does not mean that it trickles
down to the street corner or to the ballpark. That is where some of
the focus must be.
If we are serious about this, then all of the sports teams should
set up some kind of mechanism—an ombudsperson, a complaint
line—so that people in the community have confidence that the
people are taking the implementation of these principles in a
serious way, consistent with principles of equality and fairness.
Just one last point and I will conclude. In the short term, there
may be security measures implemented to address the sense of
imminent threat—for example, as I have mentioned, increase of
metal detectors and surveillance cameras at public sporting
facilities. Where those measures and technologies reduce our basic
freedoms, we should see them as temporary adjustments. We must
never learn to accept them as permanent adjustments. Short-term

99

See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (New Am. Library Trade 1983) (1948). In 1984, the
protagonist, Winston, lives in a country run by Big Brother, a political party that conducts
video and audio surveillance of its citizens and prohibits independent thought. Id.
100
See Al Baker, Commissioner Bans Profiling Using Race by the Police, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2002, at B3.
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safety and security measures must not translate into permanent
restrictions on our fundamental and precious freedoms.
This is not inconsistent with the statements that have been
made so far that five years from now we should still be looking at
this issue. But we should not in the short term buy into a society—
especially at sporting events, which I think are integral to the
American culture—which erodes in a permanent way basic
freedoms with which we have come to identify ourselves with in
the world.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR FALLON: Thank you very much.
Let me just see if I can clarify for myself—and maybe some
other people have the same question—where we stand now.
If I understand Norman Siegel correctly, he is raising concerns
about facial recognition technology, about the use of metal
detectors, and about use of video surveillance cameras that might
occur in the future, but if the NFL Best Practices Guidelines are
indicative of what is currently going on, these practices are not
currently being implemented, at least on a wide scale. Is that
right?
MR. AHLERICH: Video surveillance cameras are very much a
part of Best Practices, but not facial recognition. A very distinct
difference here, because you are comparing against a database with
the facial recognition technology.101 But the capturing of the
images of patrons as they enter stadiums and during non-game
days is certainly very much a part of Best Practices, with proper
signage.
And I would take exception there. I certainly think we need to
work hard, and it is part of Best Practices to ensure that adequate
signage must be in place. Absolutely it is required that you must
give notice to patrons that they are under video surveillance as they
enter and that their images are being captured.

101

See Mark G. Milone, Biometric Surveillance: Searching for Identity, 57 BUS. LAW.
497, 501 (2001); Public Places; Play Ball, but Ban the Backpacks, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5,
2001, at 30.
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You certainly can argue the point that the expectation of
privacy when you are at a public event or an event that you enter
with a ticket would not require such signage,102 but we think that it
is appropriate to do that, and all NFL stadiums do that, or they are
urged to do it.
MR. SIEGEL: But, conceptually, it is not just privacy. I think
that the expectation of privacy is very low at a public event.103 But
it is the notion of anonymity.104 When I go to Central Park
tomorrow, it is not that I am yearning for privacy, but I want
anonymity. I do not want, unless there is a compelling government
interest, for the government, and also for the private sector, to have
my image and with whom I am associating.105
Why does the government, or the private sector or a
combination of both have to know, and have an image of, Norman
Siegel going to Shea Stadium, or to any facility? You can have my
image if, in fact, I am engaged in some criminal activity.106
Potentially, if there is some suspicious activity, you can make a
strong argument there.
But assuming none of the above, I do not think you have a right
to have my image. The government does not have a right to
102

United States v. Harris, 402 U.S. 573 (1971) (setting forth the plain view doctrine,
making it doubtful that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
appearance).
103
Nina W. Tarr, Clients’ & Students’ Stories: Avoiding Exploitation and Complying
with the Law to Produce Scholarship with Intent, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 271, 289 (1998)
(“The concerns about privacy, autonomy and dignity are not raised by this pure
observation of public events when persons have no expectation of privacy or
confidentiality . . . .”).
104
Courts have recognized a right to anonymity when related to exercising one’s First
Amendment right to association, but have stated that there is no general right to
anonymity. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Nordbrock v. Jensen, Nos. 882868, 89-15171, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 19295 (9th Cir. filed Nov. 1, 1990).
105
See Church of Hakeem v. Alameda County, 168 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that the government failed to demonstrate the compelling state interest necessary
to justify disclosure of the membership lists of the Church of Hakeem, stating that “the
anonymity of that membership remains protected by their [First Amendment] right of
associational privacy”).
106
United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom, 489 U.S. 749, 751
(1989) (“In 1924 Congress appropriated funds to enable the Department of Justice
(Department) to establish a program to collect and preserve fingerprints and other
criminal identification records.”).
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fingerprint—there are certain exceptions, such as employment
situations—people who are law-abiding.107 It seems to me those
concepts have to apply in this new technology.
For example, I would like to know, when you said that the NFL
is using video surveillance, and will be doing more of this,
currently what happens to those images? Is there a database that
the NFL has on people who come into the games?
MR. AHLERICH: The answer is no.
MR. SIEGEL: That is good to hear.
MR. ZOUBEK: If I could speak to this, I understand the issue
about having a database so that we are getting into an Orwellian
era in which you are tracking individuals.108 But, having sat at the
FBI Command Center in Newark days after September 11th, there
was a need to review as many videotapes as possible to see who
may have been associated with the attack. Had there been a rule
requiring destruction after seventy-two hours we may have missed
one of the best leads that is available to us.
So I think that is part of this balance and part of this need,
because I think that may educate people more as to why keeping
them longer may be appropriate. The issue is how you keep and
use that information. But certainly, seventy-two hours, I think, is
an arbitrary cutoff that could cut off some investigative value.
PROFESSOR FALLON: I see several people in the audience,
but if I could just sharpen the question ever so slightly, I would
recall that the topic for the panel is legal issues involving security,
and I would put this question to Norman Siegel in the first
instance:
Insofar as you are raising questions about whether somebody
has a right not to have his or her image captured and to have that
image retained, are you using the word “right” in the legal sense,
that there is some legal prohibition against the capturing and
retention of that image; or are you using the term “right” in the a
107

Id.
This is a reference to the accumulation of information and surveillance of individual
citizens by the political party Big Brother, which controls the government in the novel
1984. ORWELL, supra note 99.
108
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policy-based, moral sense, indicating only that you would prefer
that this were not done and that you think it would not be done in a
better society?
MR. SIEGEL: Your question shows that you are not only a
good moderator, but a good lawyer. But it also shows, without
sounding arrogant, when I said in my opening, “if I may add the
word policy issues,” I was being a good lawyer as well.
I think that these are frontier issues. For example, when I make
the argument about anonymity, as opposed to privacy, if we were
debating, Mr. Ahlerich and I, I would probably have to concede
that my case for privacy argument was not so strong based on case
law at this point.109
But anonymity is a concept, as I explained before, that I think
in due time will be used if in fact the surveillance technology is
used as I think it is going to be used. And then, if we came back
five years from now, I might be able to answer that question.
If you are asking me if I am prepared at this point to make the
legal argument in this forum today, sure. If you are asking me if I
am prepared to go before nine Supreme Court Justices and make
that argument tomorrow, I probably would not take that case
tomorrow. But I might take it in a year or two.
It all interacts in our judicial system, and judges are human
beings too. In fact, they might be going to ballparks as well—I
would hope some of them go to ballparks. In the context of that,
what you do is you develop new theories, new concepts, in the
court of public opinion. And, once there is a receptivity and
acceptance of the concept, you are then prepared to test it in the
court of law. I think in due time these issues will arise.
If you do not like seventy-two hours, buy into the concept and
we can negotiate, maybe ninety-six hours.
No, more seriously, the bottom line is that when we were in the
fight about crime in the streets, we would always say that if you
wanted to put a checkpoint on every street corner in America with
a video surveillance camera on every lamp post in America, I

109

See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 589.
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guarantee you we could drastically reduce the street crime issue,
but in going that route we would not be America anymore.
It is the same point here. You could put a video surveillance
camera in every section in every sports facility and you could use
facial recognition, you could keep that information in perpetuity
and you could have DNA samples every time someone is born in
America, and you will probably have a better chance of
apprehending criminals and terrorists, but then we are not America
anymore.
If you are serious about the balance—and I am sure you are,
but the problem is whether other people are—when you do the
balance, you have to take into account the freedom principles and
values, in addition to the security. When people continue, as
political people do, to tell us that we have to choose one or
another, or I get up and I read we have to give up fifteen percent of
our freedom in order to get six percent safety, I reject that notion.
It is simplistic, it is unrealistic, and it is manipulative to the
American public.
MR. SQUIRES: We have a closed-circuit TV camera system at
Giants Stadium. On a game day we are 80,000 people strong,110
we are the tenth largest city in New Jersey,111 on approximately
twelve acres. Think about that, 80,000 people on twelve acres.
Our job is to make sure that everybody enjoys themselves. Our
cameras are not used to violate anybody’s privacy. The people
who behave themselves we do not even see. The cameras are for
the people who misbehave; we capture their images, and if we
have to go to court, we use that.

110

See, e.g., Leonard Shapiro, Bryant, Barber Send Giants Into Postseason, WASH.
POST., Dec. 29, 2002 (estimating attendance at the December 29th game (New York
Giants game against the Philadelphia Eagles) to be greater than 78,782).
111
N.J. Dep’t of Labor, Table 6: Population for the 15 Largest Counties, Cities and
Townships in New Jersey (1999–2000), available at http://www.wnjpin.net/
OneStopCareerCenter/LaborMarketInformation/lmi25/pl94/nj_tab_6.pdf (last visited
Mar. 25, 2003) (citing 2000 New Jersey State Census data listing the ninth largest New
Jersey city, Trenton, with a population of 85,403 and the tenth largest city, Camden, with
a population of 79,904).
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Our tapes are re-recorded every twenty-four hours, so we do
not even have the ability, if we do not have an incident then, to go
back to it.
So it is used more for the protection and the enjoyment of our
guests than anything else.
Now, it is funny, this facial recognition system. I just had a
brief on it this past week. My question to the guys was, “How
accurate is it?” They said, “About fifty percent.”112 I said, “Well,
that is certainly not good enough.”
You know, we have to remember—and I think Paul put it best
when he said that—you know, I said before, our security should be
like a good boxing referee. We are there to help. We want you to
enjoy the event. When we start providing so much security that
people cannot enjoy the event, they are not going to go anymore.
So you have to temper safety with everything else.
Thank you.
MR. SIEGEL: Could you use the word “freedom?”
MR. SQUIRES: Listen, I spent twenty-six years of my life
defending the freedom of this country, so I do not even want to get
into that debate.
QUESTIONER: Is there not a legal difference between your
right to anonymity walking down the street or walking into Central
Park versus going to a stadium where you already have to pay a
price to get in, and in some cases many people cannot afford the
price to get in? It seems to me they are two different situations.
MR. SIEGEL: I still think there is anonymity in a sports
facility. Why should anybody know where you go and with
whom? You could have all kinds of scenarios where you do not
want anyone to know who you are going with, from political to
social associations.
Hearing what Bill Squires said and how Giants Stadium uses
their surveillance is encouraging. He is saying that within twentyfour hours it automatically erases it. They will know during the
112

See Mike Bone et al., Evaluating Facial Recognition Technology for Drug Control
Applications, ONDCP International Counterdrug Technology Symposium, June 26–28,
2001, at 8, http://www.frvt.org/DLs/ONDCP2001.pdf.
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course of that afternoon whether there were any criminal activities
taking place there, as a general proposition. There could be some
instances where in fact you will not know until later on, so that is
why I suggested seventy-two hours.
But the balance is you are going to lose some of that, in the
sense that if we agreed on a week, for example, where someone did
not make a complaint until two weeks later, but that probably will
be aberrational, not general. In that context, you weigh losing that
identification evidence with the fact that you do not have the
database possibilities, which is antithetical to a democratic society
as a general proposition.
But to your question, if I am in Shea Stadium and am lawabiding, I am not sure that people have a right to know that I am
there.
MR. ZOUBEK: It would depend on the ownership of that
particular facility. Is it a public facility? Is it a privately owned
facility?
There are the rights of a private property owner.113 If I wanted
to put a camera in every corner of my home, I certainly could do
so, and it would certainly be my right to do so.114 In the balance of
working with spectators, if you identify that is what you are doing,
that you are coming into our home, you may enjoy yourself
because we provide entertainment for you while you are in our
home, but these are our rules while you are in our home. The
owner’s control is stronger to the extent to which it is a private
facility.115
MR. SIEGEL: Right. But that could change, too, if the state
legislature or Congress decided to legislate and to regulate video
surveillance cameras.
It is interesting. Video surveillance cameras, in general, are
popping up all over America. In December 1998, I did a study just
113

G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977) (“Business premises
invite lesser privacy expectations.”).
114
Id. See also Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 184 (1st Cir. 1997)
(dismissing invasion of privacy claim arising from employers surveillance of employees
in work areas).
115
See G.M. Leasing Corp., 429 U.S. at 353.

1 - PANEL I FORMAT

2003]

4/15/03 9:25 AM

LEGAL ISSUES IN SPORTS SECURITY

381

in Manhattan, and there were 2,400 video surveillance cameras.116
It was not Orwellian because eighty-nine percent of them were
privately owned.117 But all of those cameras—that is almost three
and a half years ago—were in place without a single public
hearing, without a single public debate with regard to the pros and
cons of video surveillance technology.
You could develop a piece of legislation that would alter what
you just said. And I think that the proponents of video surveillance
cameras, including the ballparks, have to come to understand that
as they move in this direction, if they do it in an insensitive way
and not a balanced manner, I would predict that that legislation
will become more of a possibility.
QUESTIONER: Regarding the facial recognition system, Bill,
I do not know which one you looked at, because there are many of
them out there and they work on different principles.
The one that I am familiar with that works the best actually
takes a video and converts it to an algorithm of the face.118 Once
that is done, the video itself is discarded as useless.119 So when
you go panning through a crowd, what it does is match the
database against another algorithm to form that match. So you are
really not looking at faces, you are looking at a mathematical
formula, which provides a lot more protection. And it does have
intelligence built into it so that, with weight gains and facial hair
and the like, it does actually learn and adjust those records.120 So
somebody who is not in a system that you are comparing it to, you
would have no idea who these people are in any case. You can use
116

See Norman Siegel, Beware of Video Surveillance Cameras, New York Civil
Liberties Union, at http://www.nyclu.org/siegel/siegel7.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2003);
NYCLU Surveillance Camera Project, http://www.nyclu.org/surveillance.html (last
visited Mar. 16, 2003). Maps identifying camera locations in Manhattan can be found at
http://www.mediaeater.com/cameras/maps/nyc.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2003).
117
ORWELL, supra note 99 (In 1984, all surveillance was conducted by the government
in an attempt to control citizens’ thoughts and actions.)
118
See, e.g., Dep’t of Defense Counterdrug Technology Development Program Office,
FERET: Overview, at http://www.dodcounterdrug.com/facialrecognition/Feret/feret.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
119
Id.
120
See RAND, Super Bowl Surveillance: Big Brother or Beneficial Technology?, at
http://www.rand.org/natsec_area/products/ip_biometrics.html (last visited Mar. 16,
2003).

1 - PANEL I FORMAT

382

4/15/03 9:25 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13: 349

the video after the fact to send it in to then have it scanned through
a system. But it really does provide a lot of privacy as long as you
are not in anyone’s system.
MR. SIEGEL: When you say “system,” do you mean criminal
database?
QUESTIONER: Yes.
MR. SIEGEL: Just—and maybe you can comment also—the
other part when I talk about implementation, whatever did happen
at the Super Bowl, the database was incredibly narrow. The idea
was looking for terrorists—it turned out what they were looking
for was pickpockets or ticket scalpers.121
QUESTIONER: Right. It goes back to garbage-in/garbage-out.
It has to be matched up to the appropriate source.
MR. SIEGEL: Well, but, more importantly, it is connected to
false security. What I am saying is that some of this is inviting
theory, but what is in place does not match the theory. Therefore,
the American public could be misled into thinking that this new
technology is making you safer when in fact it is not doing that. If
we are going to be serious and realistic about this, which I think we
are all committed to, we should not be setting technology in
motion that gives a false sense of security.
MR. AHLERICH: That is mostly correct in terms of what was
in the database in Tampa, but also the image of Eric Robert
Rudolph, who had been charged with the bombing in Atlanta, and
his associates were in the database also, which we thought was
completely relevant to protecting the event.

121

See, e.g., ACLU, Q&A on Facial Recognition Technology, ACLU Archives, at
http://archive.aclu.org/issues/privacy/facial_recognition_faq.html (last visited Mar. 16,
2003).
A second use of the [facial recognition] technology was at the 2001 Super
Bowl in Tampa, where pictures were taken of every attendee as they entered
the stadium through the turnstiles and compared against a database of some
undisclosed kind. The authorities would not say who was in that database, but
the software did flag [nineteen] individuals. The police indicated that some of
those were false alarms, and no one flagged by the system was anything more
than a petty criminal such as a ticket scalper.
Id.
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QUESTIONER: Just one more, commenting on the ticketing
issue. In most cases in sporting events now, there is a very small
percentage that actually pays cash for a ticket in advance or at the
gate. So in almost every instance when you do have a problem at a
sporting event, you can trace back the origin of who purchased the
ticket in any case. So it is a very, very tiny number of people who
are anonymous.
MR. SQUIRES: Just to address the facial recognition, we did
not solicit the presentation, the presentation came to us. But the
technology that they use is measuring the pixels between the two
eyes. They have shown where—this presentation was impressive,
but, like I said, fifty percent accurate is not going to happen for us.
PROFESSOR FALLON: In some ways, in comparison with
what I would have expected coming in, the conversation here has
been remarkably sanguine.
What I mean by “remarkably
sanguine” is this: everybody agrees that we have to have a balance
between protection of security on the one hand and protection of
liberties and anonymity and so forth on the other hand. Everybody
seems to agree that what is for the most part being done now seems
to be sensible and adequate with respect to protecting security. I
do not hear anybody here on the panel advocating that dramatic
new steps be taken.
Norman Siegel objects to some use of video surveillance
cameras, but his principal objections, apart from that, have been
levied at things that might be done in the future but that have not
been done yet.
And so, as I say, I get some sense everybody up here is
relatively content with the way that the world is today.
So here is my question: As somebody who goes to sporting
events and is concerned about my security when I go there, how
sanguine ought I to feel? How great is the threat to me when I go
to a sporting event, or to somebody who goes to a sporting event at
Giants Stadium, and what else might be done to deal with that
threat? Indeed, what likely would be done if, God forbid, there
were a successful terrorist attack on a sports facility somewhere in
the country? What would happen next?
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MR. SIEGEL: Before anyone answers, I just want to comment.
I am not as sanguine as you think I am. It is early Friday morning.
I do not know enough about what is actually taking place. As a
civil libertarian, I believe in fairness. I will not make accusations
unless I have evidence. What I have done here this morning is lay
out my conceptual objections and concerns to certain technology.
For example, I came in prepared to be critical of the 2001
Tampa Super Bowl, and then Mr. Ahlerich told me outside certain
things that I had not known before.
I am laying the groundwork. If in fact—and it is very possible
that history proves this—we find out after the fact that some of
these things are currently taking place, you will hear me yelling
and screaming. But at this point I do not have that information.
Everyone here has said, for example, on racial profiling they
are against it. Well, that is good to hear. But I also made the
comment that everybody says that. And if, in fact, it is taking
place, or did take place, there could be some challenges to that.
We do not have that evidence at this moment. I just wanted to
qualify that for the record.
PROFESSOR FALLON: Right. Okay.
So to other members of the panel as well, how safe are we
today? What could be done to make us safer? What would be
done next to make us safer if we had some reason to think that the
threat was greater than we apparently take it to be today?
MR. ZOUBEK: I think one of the issues that we have had, both
in government and in terms of the operation of facilities, is: What
is the threat and how does it get communicated?
One of the greatest difficulties is that we know that there is a
generalized threat, but we do not have any specific information as
to where a strike might occur. So what we are engaged in is a
generalized target hardening, identifying where the vulnerabilities
might be, and trying to make it as safe as possible for people to
decide that they will continue to go to sporting events.
As I was going back and preparing for these remarks, I saw a
very chilling Security Management article from 2000 that had
focused on whether all other tall office towers were doing the same
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“great job” with security that the World Trade Center was as a
result of its $60 million ‘Gold Trophy’ security efforts in the wake
of the 1993 World Trade Center attack?”122
The first thing I heard on September 11th was “a plane has
gone into the World Trade Center.” I heard that from the Chief of
the Port Authority Police. I thought it was a small plane. That
specific threat was not in my realm of thinking, or many people’s
realm of thinking.
Because we do not know what may happen next, we do not
know where it may happen next, what we do is identify
vulnerabilities and attempt to try take reasonable security efforts.
We cannot make guarantees as to what is going to happen next,
that is a very difficult thing. I think we have done everything that
we reasonably can to identify the vulnerabilities, but I think we
constantly have to be gathering intelligence. And sporting
facilities—I am sure Milton, with his background—a lot of
facilities have hooked up with the local law enforcement
authorities, with the increased intelligence efforts that we have to
engage in, so we know a little bit more about the threats.
The problem is we are really in a stage right now where we
have a generalized threat that we are not fully able to evaluate.
MR. SQUIRES: I think if we were to do any more at Giants
Stadium it would disrupt the enjoyment.
The only other thing I could think that we are not doing is
checking every car that comes through the toll plazas. I think if
you have ever been out there—27,500 cars, 32,000 on a Monday
night—that is virtually impossible for us to do and it would disrupt
the enjoyment of the game.
So we feel pretty comfortable that we are going to take
probably all steps—I do not think we could take any more, to be
honest with you.

122

Michael A. Gips, Building in Terrorism’s Shadow, Security Managment Online,
http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/000852.html (May 2000) (“In the last seven
years, the World Trade Center spent $60 million in capital funds to counter this [terrorist]
threat, setting the gold standard for trophy building security.”).
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MR. AHLERICH: For our events we used a sliding scale, with
the idea that the games in the post-season, the ten post-season
games including Super Bowl, were higher risk, higher threat, again
to generalize. We received very few specific threats that were
vetted through law enforcement that had a terrorist sense to them
during the year—two or three that proved to be not valid, which
we worked very, very hard in advance of games.
The amount of security went up for our post-season games,
with additional measures being taken in each one of the stadiums,
security reviews and additional measures being taken, with the
culmination being the Super Bowl, where we went to the next step,
to a complete hardened perimeter all the way around the Super
Dome and magnetometers and pat-down searches,123 which are
done at a few stadiums but not very many. Again, these were
consent searches across the board, with full signage and full
notification to all fans. We had complete cooperation from our
fans at Super Bowl.
QUESTIONER: As a lawyer/sports-fan/civil libertarian, I want
to give you an observation, an anecdote, and a hypothetical.
The observation is that at Shea Stadium we are right in the
flight path.124 On a Saturday afternoon, there have to be eight-toten planes that fly directly over Shea Stadium. We are all
expecting one of these days for one of those planes to just fall into
Shea Stadium. Why that has not been made into a constant noflight zone is beyond me.
The anecdote is, as a New Yorker and a sports fan, I know that
I can sit anywhere I want in Shea Stadium. You just talk to the
guards and you make your private arrangements.
I went in there one day and all my friends were gone. I went
over to one of the people that I knew and said, “Where is So-andSo or So-and-So?”
“They have all been fired.”
123

Mary Foster, Super Bowl Security No Leisurely Stroll for NFL, at http://www.
globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020128-attack01.htm (Jan. 28, 2002).
124
Shea Stadium, at http://www.ballparks.com/baseball/national/sheast.htm (last visited
Mar. 16, 2003) (“Shea Stadium is the noisiest outdoor ballpark in the majors because it is
in the flight path of La Guardia Airport.”).
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I said, “What happened?”
He said, “They were all taking bribes and they were caught on
videotape,”—and they were—and they were all fired with no
appeal. They are all back, by the way.
[Laughter.]
MR. SIEGEL: They did not need an appeal, then.
QUESTIONER: The hypothetical is: I am accustomed to being
searched, I am accustomed to taking my belt off, I am accustomed
to taking my shoes off, to going through metal detectors, because
President Clinton has been there or John Rocker has been there, we
have had surveillance in that stadium up the wazoo. But what
would happen if I walked through the gate and some facial
recognition system said, “Stop him, he’s the one.” How do I rebut
that? How do I get into the game? And let’s say that it is a World
Series game and I have paid $1,000 for a ticket. What happens
then? And what happens if I cannot get into the game and the
stadium is wrong?
MR. SIEGEL: Well, you would have a cause of action.
But putting that aside, I think that is exactly the point. It is one
of the reasons why, knowing what I know about facial recognition
software technology, I would strongly recommend that it not be
employed at this point.
I would leave the door open if the technology changed. But as
of this point, with this season coming up for baseball, for example,
at Shea, they would be making a huge mistake to go in that
direction and use that facial recognition. And there is a good
chance, a little more than forty percent, that your hypothetical
would actually happen.
MR. AHLERICH: I sit on a committee with the International
Association of Assembly Managers for Security that is developing
a set of Best Practices for a much larger scope in terms of venues,
and nowhere is facial recognition technology being seriously
considered, that I know of, certainly not by this task force, this
committee.125 I mean, we are talking about it a lot, I think it is
125

The International Association of Assembly Managers [IAAM] is an organization
designed to provide leadership and education for those who manage and serve public
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good that we talk about it a lot, but it is not being used, and for the
exact reasons that we have discussed here. The technology is
premature and there are some privacy issues.
But let’s not throw it out. As you say, keep it open; let’s keep
it open. But let’s debate it, as we are, which I think is appropriate.
It is not being used, and I do not think it is going to be used
right away, from what I hear from the professionals.
MR. SQUIRES: I would hope that if you are paying $1,000 for
a ticket that the Yankees are playing the Mets in the World Series.
MR. SIEGEL: If it did happen, I will give you my cell phone
number, because I will be at Shea this October, and I will come out
and get you in.
MR. ZOUBEK: It is going to depend on the circumstances of
whether or not it is part of the generalized security enhancement
that the stadium is engaged in and you will have to balance
competing interests at the time—privacy versus security. Where
there is a specific threat to a facility, then the public, the fans,
everyone is going to have the expectation that we are doing more,
and then you are going to have to evaluate the competing interests
of privacy versus security.
I agree with Bill that if the devices you are seeing are only fifty
percent accurate, then you are not into a zone where you are even
considering using it. But if there was a compelling need at that
time, in terms of the security threat, that would give the facility, I
think, a different base of argument, depending upon the technology
at the time.
MR. SIEGEL: Opening day for Yankee Stadium, because
President Bush was there, there was a different kind of security

assembly facilities. See http://www.iaam.org (n.d.). The IAAM’s Safety and Security
Task Force was established to review and recommend security guidelines for venue
manager. See Press Release, IAAM, IAAM Safety and Security Task Force, Record
Numbers Attend International Association of Assembly Managers’ Conference on Patron
Safety and Security Preparedness at Public Venues (Nov. 21, 2001),
http://www.iaam.org/Industry_News/icmc.htm.
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system than the remaining games.126 But it then raised the issue
of: Is that going to happen at every game? Even if they are playing
the Kansas City Royals and nobody is there, will that technology
be used?
These are issues that we have to keep our eyes on, and I think
we have to raise our civil libertarian concerns and objections so
that the folks here are not making decisions in a vacuum.
You would be surprised—and I hope it does not come out too
corny—that the objections, if they are presented in a reasonable
fashion, sometimes the decision makers actually listen and they
hold back.
But I would hope that when you are doing these task forces you
put civil rights people on those panels so that you do not have the
divisiveness that these issues could create. Have them in the room,
and then make a conscious decision, as opposed to making the
decision afterwards. And I think, unless you tell me otherwise,
very often they do not do that, and I think it is a mistake.
QUESTIONER: Well, since we are back at law school, I feel I
want to ask this hypothetical to the panel. Let us assume it is five
or six years into the future. Facial recognition technology is now
ninety-eight percent accurate. It is linked with local criminal
databases, the FBI database, potentially working with Immigration
and the DMVs around the country, in order to get a very sure
match on your face. Also buffer that against the fact that
September 11th has taken place and along the way during these
five years we have defeated potential terrorist threats in the United
States where they have been caught before they were able to
accomplish their mission.
I would like to open it up to the panel to see what they think
about using this technology that now has been more perfected in
the future at sporting events, which are probably one of the best
targets for these terrorists.

126

Strike One: President Bush Throws Out Ceremonial First Pitch, CNN/Sports
Illustrated, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/mlb/2001/worldseries/news/2001/
10/30/bush_ap (Oct. 30, 2001).
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MR. SIEGEL: Would you add into the hypothetical that if in
fact the digitized facial—whatever the technical word is—the
picture of the person, that if you are not in the database, it is
immediately destroyed?
QUESTIONER: I would say that most people are in the DMV.
I am saying that every time you take a picture with the
government, you are recorded somewhere, obviously, and that you
can use that database through a broadband access to immediately
get a match on that person.
MR. SQUIRES: I think the database that we are looking at is
not the 275 million people across the United States. It is more of
those who may have some sort of a record or may be more of a
threat to the stadium.127
Now, I do not think we would ever look at jaywalkers, but
maybe scalpers certainly, maybe people who we have ejected from
the facility who cannot return without permission, those kind of
things.
But I would have to say this: I mean, who would have thought
twenty years ago that we would be implementing the security
procedures we have now? I think we need to stay in touch with
what is going on and at least evaluate it and look at it.
MR. SIEGEL: I would be opposed to that in the way you
described it. It is just overly broad; it dragnets in a large, large
percentage of innocent people. I would be opposed to that.
The harder question is if you created a criminal database with a
much more narrow scope and if you were able to have the
technology so that if Siegel walked through, and assuming in six
years I am still the law-abiding person I am now, that they do not
have that kind of capacity to keep my photo. That is a harder
hypothetical.
But the way you framed it, I am opposed to that.
QUESTIONER: Well, I am just saying the reason it is linked
with these databases is that terrorists—and I have been following
the case very diligently for my own reasons—all these people were
127
See John D. Woodward, Jr., Super Bowl 2001—The Game Was the Least Interesting
Part, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2001, at B4.
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able to get into the country, develop an identification through their
local DMVs, and go around as people, and no one suspected them.
They were the most law-abiding people that you could see. They
were the people who lived next door. Terrorists do not wear big
signs on their heads saying “I am a terrorist” and they do not try to
commit acts of criminality until the very end.
MR. SIEGEL: You get a picture and you then know that
somebody has a driver’s license. So what does that tell you?
QUESTIONER: All I am saying is that the reason I framed the
hypothetical that way is because of these people—to make the
database wider to try to catch them and to try to keep them
recorded.
MR. AHLERICH: But they would have to be wanted. They
would have to be identified as a terrorist. The people who were
here were not wanted. They were here illegally, but they were not
tagged, if you will.128 So even if you would have captured their
images, they would not have been stopped.
MR. SIEGEL: All drivers are not terrorists.
MR. ZOUBEK: Let me ask, to follow back on, Professor, your
comment in terms of the legal issue here: What if I have a stadium
owner who says, “You know, I love my fans so much, I would
really just like to have a picture of all of the sections from each of
the games and I want to have a photo album over here of all my
happy fans over the years?”
MR. SIEGEL: Get consent. That is not hard.
MR. ZOUBEK: What has he violated? What has he done that
is illegal? What has he done that you can sue him for under
current law that he has violated?

128

See, e.g., Karen Alexander, Airport to Get Facial Recognition Technology, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, § 2, at 1.
The way the new [facial recognition] technology is going to be deployed . . .
would have been useless in stopping Mohamed Atta, the suspected ringleader
of the Sept. 11 terrorist hijackings. Unless he had been arrested, he would not
have been scanned. And since Atta is not believed to have had a criminal
record . . . his face would not have produced a match.
Id.
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It is no different than advising a client in any other line of
business as it relates to the duty of care of their participants and
their spectators.
One of the notions that I think is important to keep in mind is
that to the extent to which there are Best Practices developed in
your industry, if your client is not abiding by those Best Practices,
that will be Exhibit 1 in any litigation.
So your client must remain current as much as possible with
security developments in their line of the sports business, whether
it related to obligations to individual player clients, whether it is
obligations for stadiums operators or event organizers. I do not
think the analysis is really going to be much different than in many
other fields of law.
But there are other issues for sports lawyers, such as union
relations when criminal background checks are done for security
purposes.129 Also, how prepared are your employees to respond to
an incident. As first responders, what protection have you
provided for them should something happen in the facility? Those
are some of the issues affecting the day-to-day operation of a
facility or a sporting business.
PROFESSOR FALLON: In terms of suits under current law, I
want to ask a question that maybe cuts a little bit the other way
from the thread of the discussion as it has developed so far.
We have here an enormously effective lawyer advocate in
Norman Siegel, who has focused the conversation to a very
considerable extent on the kinds of issues that a civil liberties
lawyer would raise in response to increased surveillance and other
efforts to protect security. But not all effective lawyers are civil
liberties lawyers. There are a lot of very effective lawyers who are
plaintiffs’ tort lawyers. If there were some kind of a disaster at a
facility, you can be sure that those plaintiffs’ tort lawyers would be
eager to jump into the fray, filing lawsuits claiming that what had

129

To institute a policy of criminal background checks on employees represented by a
union and covered by a collective bargaining agreement, an employer will have an
obligation to bargain with the union. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000).
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been done to protect security would not satisfy the duty of
reasonable care that any facility owner or manager bears.130
So is that not relevant to the question about what facilities
would have to do with developing technologies, the duty of
reasonable care? Would we not have to worry about that as well?
And then, as a related question, I am curious, for those of you
actually in the business of making decisions and counseling clients,
to what extent are you talking to them about legal issues, possible
legal liability, and duties of reasonable care, going beyond what
would be the sensible thing to do from a business perspective
anyway?
MR. SIEGEL: Your question is a good one.
There is a flip concern that I have. That is, for example, in
private buildings you see more and more surveillance cameras. I
had a conversation once with an attorney who represented a co-op,
and he argued, “Well, there is no crime in the building, but it has
become the standard now that you have to have them.” Once you
go down that slippery slope, you are going to have all these kinds
of surveillance cameras in private buildings. And why are they
there? Well, because the Jones’s had it, and therefore that
becomes the standard.
And generally in advising clients, lawyers want to give them
all their deliberative thoughts and say, “It would be better for you
to do this.” And then, lo and behold, in a short period of time,
every building has a video surveillance network. So that is what
we could be going into.
MR. AHLERICH: I just want to comment briefly on the
thinking that we had as we developed the Best Practices.
One of our attorneys in the initial stage of the discussion said,
“You are creating a very, very dangerous set of documents.” That
argument ultimately did not win out. Ultimately the argument that
we had the responsibility to provide care and some sort of evenhanded protection to our fans to the best of our ability and urge the
stadium to do that was our larger responsibility and the right thing

130

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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to do. But it was debated rigorously among our attorneys and
those of us in the process of protecting our fans.
MR. SQUIRES: That being said, Milt, those Best Practices,
when they were given to the teams and to the facility managers,
there was nothing that said, “You must do this, you must do that.”
Everything was recommended, and all the recommendations were
pretty darn good.
PROFESSOR FALLON: Let me just pick up, for example, on
the issue of metal detectors in Best Practices. If you use metal
detectors for some events—the Super Bowl, or use metal detectors
if the President is coming to Yankee Stadium—then presumably
you could use metal detectors for all events. If you are not using
metal detectors for all events when you use them for some events,
are you living up to a standard of reasonable care?
MR. AHLERICH: We think ultimately it is up to the facility
whether they use it or not, or those in charge of the event. And the
use of metal detectors has to be reasonably balanced on the threat
that you have. At Super Bowl, we believed that the threat was
very high.131 We believed that, as the icon of sporting events, that
it necessarily provided a very attractive target to terrorists.132
I heard a comment earlier about the use of metal detectors and
how effective were they, whether or not they were a good idea. I
would suggest that they do a lot of good. And we know they do a
lot of good, because where you use them you find guns and knives
in the bushes outside of the locations where they have been
employed.
We are not making it an absolute standard across the board.
They are being used in some stadiums, very few. They are being
used randomly in more stadiums. And I think we will certainly
continue to use them at our premier events.
MR. SQUIRES: If I could add real quickly, in twenty-six years
at Giants Stadium, we have used metal detectors twice, both by
direction. We did not volunteer to do it.
131

Mark Lepage, Football? What Football?: Tomorrow, Many Millions of People Will
Watch U2, Paul McCartney, Britney Spears—Oh, Yeah, and the Super Bowl Game,
GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 2, 2002.
132
Id.
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October 1995, when Pope John Paul II came, the Secret
Service said, “You will use metal detectors.” We had to open up
the gates five hours prior to the Mass because it took that long to
get people in. That was understandable.
The second time we had to use them was last summer for
’NSync. That is not understandable, not even for a second.
I have a challenge with metal detectors. I understand what Milt
is saying. Because of what we are doing at the gates, checking
people, after games I have my ushers go through all the aisles. For
those of you who attend Giants games, do not give this secret out,
but I actually go and look for cans. Where I find empty cans, I put
an undercover individual in that section next week to see if you are
smuggling cans. And then we take the appropriate action.
We do not find cans anymore. And it is not because we are
doing such a good job at the checkpoint. It is because people know
we are searching.
The same thing—we found knives and we found all kinds of
things outside the gates in the trash cans. It has been pretty
incredible. And as the season wore on, as people got used to it, we
found less and less outside the gates.
But the metal detectors—you know, I found in 1995 when the
Pope came that the metal detectors are somewhat sensitive or
insensitive. It rained. It affected the measurements and whether
they worked or not. But the most important thing is you’ve got a
different staff coming and working—well, you try to keep
consistent with your staff, but to train them in how to use them
properly.
At ’NSync—and I did not object to it at all—they were
magging133 the front of the people but not the back of the people,
and I said to my people, “Well, you know, there are two sides to a
person.” If you are going to bring something in, you get it in one
way or the other.

133

Security personnel use the term “magging” to refer to the process of using hand-held
metal detectors.
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So I am not sold on the metal detectors yet, and I think it will
be a while—I mean a long while—before you see them in our
place.
MR. SIEGEL: I do not know the answer to the following
question, but I will raise it. Again, in view of what we do know
what happened at Logan Airport on September 11th, if you had an
event that you really wanted to be absolutely sure that there was
going to be no terrorist attack, I am not sure the reasonable thing to
do is to just rely on a metal detector. 134 There is actual
technology—the X-ray concept that I think customs has; some
places have it, I have heard—but it is very expensive, and as a
result it is not being used.135
But if you had hypothetically a threat, which does not exist
here today, that there would be a terrorist who would be so upset
by what the other gentlemen are saying here today that they would
want to come and engage in some terrorism and take everyone out,
if you put a metal detector up at this door, the terrorists know, as
we know from September 11th, that they do not need to bring any
metal.136 So they bring a plastic device in here.
So if you were really concerned about protecting everybody
and you were going to put a metal detector out there, should you
not then elevate the technology for X-ray equipment that would
detect stuff like plastic explosives?

134

Two of the four planes involved in the September 11th attacks departed from
Boston’s Logan Airport. It is believed that the terrorists utilized box cutters and plastic
knives to hijack the planes, weapons which got past the metal detector security checks at
the airport terminal. Following the attacks, airports have begun to supplement metal
detectors with additional security measures. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jeff Jacobs, City Finds New Perspective, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Sept.
19, 2001, at C1.
135
See Sara Kehaulaiani Goo, Large, Small Airports to Use Different Security Systems,
WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2002, at A5; A New Line at the Airport, HARTFORD COURANT
(Conn.), Jan. 2, 2003, at A8; Port Officials: We Need More Money for Security, News
Max, at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/1/29/104432.shtml (Jan. 29,
2002).
136
Peter Mansbridge, Attack on America, National Transcripts, at http://www.tv.cbc.ca/
national/trans/T010912.html (Sept. 12, 2001) (“Each plane has three to six highjackers on
board armed with box cutters and plastic knives.”).
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I know most people are shocked when I raise that because the
stereotype of the civil liberties lawyer is that we do not want
anything. But that is not true.
MR. AHLERICH: That is why we also employed the patdown, because we were concerned about individuals bringing in
large amounts of C4 plastic strapped to their bodies. It has not
been done in this country, but certainly that has been used
elsewhere.137
MR. SIEGEL: The pat-down is more clearly nonindividualized suspicion and more intrusive than walking through a
door that has some X-ray capacity that a light goes on and then you
have the individualized suspicion. The courts have not recognized
this, unfortunately from my perspective, from airport searches,
from searches in courthouses. I have been involved in some
litigation on that going back thirty years.
And also, quite frankly, as the panelists have pointed out, the
public is not receptive to these “lawyer arguments.” And so, as a
result, those transgressions continue and grow.
MR. ZOUBEK: I met days after September 11th with the
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in New Jersey138 to
discuss the response to September 11th and one of the first
questions I got was: “What are you doing to keep us safe?” We
then engaged in a discussion of recent detentions and the difficult
issues concerning tracking Al-Qaeda after the attacks. We
discussed that some of those decisions on who was associated with
Al-Qaeda may end in court.

137

See Terrorism: Mechanics of a Living Bomb, War Online, at http://www.waronline.
org/en/terror/suicide.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2003).
138
See Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers of N.J., Welcome, at http://www.acdlnj.org (last
visited Mar. 25, 2003).
The Association was established in 1985 . . . to respond to the continuing
problems confronting criminal defense lawyers when they honestly, ethically,
but zealously represent their clients; to protect and insure compliance with
those individual rights guaranteed by the New Jersey and United States
Constitutions; and to encourage cooperation among criminal defense lawyers
engaged in the furtherance of those objectives.
Id.
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But certainly, those who are responsible for security are going
to take those measures that protect the public. Some of the
measures may be subject to negotiation such as seventy-two hours
versus a week on the tapes but some decisions will have to be
made quickly based upon a compelling need. I hope we have the
courage to make those difficult decisions, and some of those
decisions will be challenged and litigated.
PROFESSOR FALLON: Let me play the cynic here just for a
minute.
When I hear the discussion about metal detectors, I hear
Norman Siegel raise civil liberties objections, but, frankly, it is not
one that resonates terribly much with me. It does not seem to me
to be a big deal to walk through a metal detector. There are lots of
places where I have to do it in going about my life today.
I said the question I was going to raise was a somewhat cynical
question. The discussion so far has been proceeding on the
assumption that what we are trying to do is engage in some refined
balance between security, on the one hand, and civil liberties, on
the other. Cynically, am I wrong to think that a big reason that we
do not have metal detectors is just, from the perspective of the
industry, it is too expensive?
MR. SIEGEL: I think that is right.
MR. ZOUBEK: Too expensive and impractical under certain
circumstances, because if you have 40,000 people going into a
stadium, in terms of backing them all up in long lines, it is a
question of the current technology balanced against the risk.
MR. AHLERICH: It is very difficult to have everyone trained
and to have—these are expensive devices. The better ones are
very expensive. And it is not a perfect technology.
MR. SIEGEL: But the point that you were making, Professor
Fallon, and I want to focus in on it and magnify it, is privacy is
based on the expectation of privacy. So by your own words, you
have now become accustomed—I think that was the word that you
used—to go into public facilities and to go through a metal
detector, whether it is the courtroom, or whether it is the airport.
That is a concern that civil libertarians have, that it is almost, by
definition, the more it is used, the more people become accustomed
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to it, the right diminishes to the point that it does not exist
anymore.
The Fourth Amendment—I could make a strong argument that
that is what has happened in the last twenty years. There has been
an erosion of Fourth Amendment expectations.139 As a result,
there are more searches and stops going on, frisks, than ever
before, and people have become accustomed to it.140
The proponents of these kinds of what I consider transgressions
of the Fourth Amendment have been very successful because the
public now accepts it. You will hear over and over again, “El Al141
is wonderful because they seal the cockpit prior to any passengers
boarding the plane. Why don’t we do that?” One of the reasons
we do not do some of these things is because it is not in our
tradition.
So the real question becomes: Five years from now are those
traditions going to be radically changed because of things like
September 11th?
MR. ZOUBEK: I think that one of the things we have to keep
in mind in terms of this balance is we have to recognize—and this
does redefine, perhaps, the civil liberties debate in this country—is
that we are talking about a threat that is based upon whether or not
we have the right to exist as a nation.
You review the Osama bin Laden tapes and he states “we hit
her with the first hit and the next one we will hit her with the hands
of the believers, the good believers, the strong believers.”
Underlying this threat is the belief that our society with all that it
stands for should not exist.142

139
See Jennifer L. Malin, Comment, Veronica School District 47J Action: A Further
Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, 62 BROOKLYN L. REV. 469, 486–518 (1996).
140
See, e.g., Kathleen Parker, If You’re Not Paranoid, You’re Not Paying Attention,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 20, 2002.
141
El Al is the national airline of Israel. See David K. Li & Uri Dan, L.A. Airport
Bloodbath: How Maniac Met His End Feds Tried to Boot Gunman, but Wife’s Visa Kept
Him Here, N.Y. POST, July 7, 2002, at 8.
142
Transcript of Osama bin Laden Videotape, CNN Transcrpits, at http://www.cnn.
com/2001/US/12/13/tape.transcript (Dec. 13, 2001) (providing a translated transcript of a
videotape of Osama bin Laden issued by the U.S. Department of Defense).
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That is why the public’s expectations are different now, that is
why the balance is going to be different, and that is why I think
some of the arguments that you may have been in a position to
make in prior years are going to be more difficult to make.
MR. SIEGEL: Possibly we will not make some of those
arguments. We are aware of that.
QUESTIONER: I have two questions, and they are both related
to what you are talking about.
I have heard the negative arguments of what you are not
looking to do, not looking to racial profile. That sounds very good
to me.
The first question is: What are the affirmative routes for
identifying the other-than-terrorist organizations—maybe militia
groups, or criminal records from domestic violence crimes? Are
those routes from which you would be possibly pulling
information?
The second question is: Having taken an international flight
and seeing increased security, where people were pulled aside and
searched, the people pulling them aside and doing the searches are
getting paid minimum wage, or maybe double minimum wage,
$9.50 an hour.143 So the two people who were searched most
strongly were two very attractive, scantily clad women. In a
society that pays the athletes themselves millions of dollars to
perform, if we are paying the security personnel only $9.50 an
hour, it is not giving them the due respect for the job that they have
to do.
How do you address training, support, and financing the people
who have to take this responsibility so that they can perform on the
level that we are expecting them to perform at?
MR. SQUIRES: As far as training goes, the people who work
at Giants Stadium—and I am just speaking for Giants Stadium—I
think it is kind of like the people who work at Disney World,
where I worked for three years. People bought into that system.
That is why they work there. They enjoy working there. I think
143

See Brian O’Neill, Minimum Wage vs. Maximum Security, POST-GAZETTE
(Pittsburgh), Sept. 20, 2001, at B-1.
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the people who work at Giants Stadium, I would say ninety-five
percent of the people are happy.
As a matter of fact, we polled our employees—we call them
“team members”—and asked them, given all things, would they
come back in 2002; and ninety-six percent of them responded
“yes.” So obviously, we are doing something right. I do not think
they are all there for the money. I really, really do not, because if
they are, they must be in dire straits.
But there are economics. The one thing we can do for them—
and it costs—is train. They have come out loud and clear in these
surveys that we have done that they want training. We conduct an
evacuation drill every year. It costs me a lot of money to bring in
1,500 people an hour and a half earlier to train them. But you
know what? You have to do it. You cannot expect to put
somebody in a uniform, put them out there and say, “Go figure out
what you are supposed to do.” So there is a serious investment
there, but that is part of the deal. That is just part of the deal.
That is not saying everybody is getting all the training we want
to give them, but it is certainly a step in the right direction.
QUESTIONER: Hello. I have a question for Mr. Ahlerich.
I just came back from the Olympics,144 and my experience
there was people were very interested in being searched. It was a
very positive experience.
And what I am wondering is: What is your organization doing
to collaborate and share Best Practices back and forth, because the
impact if any one of these types of sporting events is attacked
could be devastating to the rest of the industry?
MR. AHLERICH: Yes. Certainly we have no say over how
the NCAA or different universities run their events. I am
participating on a committee with the International Association of
Assembly Managers. I am sharing the Best Practices Guide with
them.

144

The 2002 Olympic Winter Games were held February 8, 2002, through February 24,
2002, in Salt Lake City, Utah. See http://www.saltlake2002.com (last visited Mar. 25,
2003).
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It is a confidential document, loosely—I mean, we are not
putting it on the front page of the newspaper, but it is easily
obtained by security professionals and stadium professionals. If
they want to see it, we are happy to share it with them.
QUESTIONER: Mr. Squires, have the security searches
resulted in any arrests for non-security violations—contraband,
anything like that?
MR. SQUIRES: No, they have not. The only situation we did
have—and it was not an arrest, it was an apprehension—was the
individual who mentioned about the thermos, “Here, honey, take
the bomb.”
I will be honest with you. You know, these people are leaving
their things in their cars, they really are, or they are disposing of
them in the trash cans outside the gates. They have made our job
very easy, and they have really bought into it.
And we have done what Paul mentioned before. We got the
word out to the public through the media. We sent flyers out with
season tickets telling season ticket holders what is permitted and
what is not permitted. So, hopefully, we will not find anything.
QUESTIONER: This question is addressed to Mr. Squires and
also the NFL. We have spent almost the entire time talking about
electronic means. One of the questioners talked about Shea
Stadium which was built in the 1960s, and Giants Stadium is
twenty-six years old. I am curious as to what is being done
architecturally to address the issues of security in these older
buildings?
MR. AHLERICH: For the older buildings, certainly the Best
Practices Guide’s perimeter security is a very important element,
and those are hard perimeters. Mr. Squires is one of our biggest
believers and best practitioners. It was something that he was
doing far in advance of Best Practices being announced.
But it is a harder sell in other locations—”Why do we need
Jersey barricades along the street? Why do we need reinforced
concrete flower pots, tree pots along the way?” It is a part of the
Best Practices Guide. We urge even closing the streets at certain
times.
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Ultimately it is a recommendation and an urging, not a
requirement, but more and more the bar is being moved in the
direction that we are urging. Mr. Squires is already doing it.
PROFESSOR FALLON: Paul Zoubek has some expertise here
too.
MR. ZOUBEK: I think one of the things to keep in mind—and
it cuts across all types of construction. You are going to see an
across-the-board examination of the security needs in terms of the
architecture of a building; the way in which the parking is set
up;145 where parking should be, and design changes generally at
the entrances and exits to accommodate enhanced security
measures.146 This new look at design and construction is
happening across the board, not only in terms of stadiums, but as
what has to occur in terms of the construction of buildings and the
reinforcement of buildings generally to enhance security.147
But I think there are going to be significant issues as someone
goes out to build a new stadium, in the post-September 11th era, in
how it is designed, how to protect against some of those potential
threat issues.
PROFESSOR FALLON: On behalf, I am sure, of the audience,
I want to thank the panel.
I came down from the
Boston/Cambridge area for this, just to be able to hear this panel.
If my reaction is in any way representative, you have just been
terrific, all of you. Thank you.
On behalf of the panel, I also I want to thank the audience.
Your questions have been insightful, provocative, and most
informative. Thank you.
145

See, e.g., Tim Barker, Many Parking Spots Off-Limits; OIA Probably Will Not Open
Terminal-Top Spaces or Spaces in Garage Close to the Terminal, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Nov. 18, 2001, at A26 (describing the post-September 11th FAA mandate prohibiting any
vehicle to be left unattended within 300 feet of an airport terminal).
146
See, e.g., Dan Haerer, Controlling Access Through Revolving Doors, Horton Doors,
at http://www.hortondoors.com/Articles/body_article1.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2003)
(presenting examples of the types of doors that can be used and the types of changes
buildings can make to increase security).
147
See John E. Crawford & Joseph Valancius, Architecture and Terrorism: More
Efficient Modern Engineering Techniques May Result in Less Safe Structures,
FASCNET, at http://www.facsnet.org/issues/specials/terrorism/buildingdesign.php3 (last
visited Mar. 16, 2003).

